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Drawing on agency theory and corporate governance, we first classify the corporate governance 
provisions within the context of family firms. Then, we probe the influence of family involvement (i.e. 
family ownership and family management) in corporate governance on the use of governance provisions 
protecting controlling and non-controlling owners. Specifically, we suggest that family ownership affects 
the use of governance provisions protecting controlling and non-controlling owners. We also suggest that 
family management will moderate the relationships between family ownership and the use of these 
governance provisions. Finally, we discuss future research directions and insights for practitioners. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Many corporations in the U.S. are controlled by a large shareholder group, typically founding families 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006, 2009). This involvement occurs when a family exerts control over the firm 
through ownership and management (Chrisman, et al., 2004). Accordingly, family controlled publicly 
traded firms are those in which the founders or family members are officers, directors, or blockholders, 
either individually or as a group (Villalonga & Amit, 2009). When family involvement leads to pursuit of 
particularistic goals and strategies (Carney, 2005), family firm behavior and performance are expected to 
be distinct from those in nonfamily firms and other family firms as well. Given the inherent differences 
between family and nonfamily firms and among family firms themselves, examining family involvement 
in corporate governance and their propensity to use corporate governance provisions can improve our 
understanding of strategy processes in publicly traded family firms, which can affect firm performance 
and shareholder wealth. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we highlight the importance of drawing 
upon agency theory and corporate governance to explain how families control corporations differently. 
By doing so, we contribute to a better understanding of the differences between publicly traded family 
and nonfamily firms. Second, we classify corporate governance provisions within the context of family 
firms considering the purpose of usage and the existence of different interest groups (i.e. controlling and 
non-controlling  owners).  Then,  we  focus  on  the  interplay  between  family  involvement  (i.e.  family 
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ownership and family management) and the use of governance provisions. Specifically, we suggest the 
moderation effects of family management on the relationships between family ownership and the 
frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting controlling and non-controlling owners. 
Thereby, we contribute to the literature by incorporating insights from agency theory with a focus on 
principal-principal agency problems and corporate governance into the developing theory of the family 
firm (Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 2005). 
The remainder of the paper will progress as follows. First, we will review agency theory (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and corporate governance. To do so, we will focus on principal- 
principal agency problems (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and corporate governance concerned with family 
involvement and the use of corporate governance provisions (Becht, et al., 2005; Gompers, et al., 2003; 
Hart, 1995; Herman, 1981). Then, we classify governance provisions within the framework of family 
firms and develop our hypotheses. In the final section of our paper, we discuss promising future research 
directions and insights for practitioners. 
 
AGENCY THEORY 
 
Agency theory is a widely used theoretic framework in examining family business. Agency 
relationships occur when a principal hires an agent to perform services and often delegates authority to 
the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As a result, separation of ownership and control can lead to 
problems when the principal and the agent hold conflicting interests, especially when it is difficult for the 
principal to monitor the behavior of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). This can lead to principal-agent type of 
agency problem, whereas principal-principal type of agency problem occurs owing to the conflict 
between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (Ali, et al., 2007). 
 
Agency Problems in Family Firms 
Traditionally, researchers assumed that fewer agency problems would occur in firm governance 
depicting unified ownership and management (Chrisman, et al., 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983), such as family firms. Aside from unified ownership and management, family firms’ 
governance is characterized by alignment of interests, monitoring advantages, and increased concern for 
shareholder wealth. These conditions can reduce agency costs (Carney, 2005; Chrisman, et al., 2004; 
Schulze, et al., 2001). 
Further, reciprocal altruism in family firms can mitigate some agency costs. Reciprocal altruism is a 
mutual moral value motivating individuals to act in a manner that would benefit other individuals without 
expecting anything in return (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2002). When family business members are 
reciprocally altruistic (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005), their interests may be aligned with the interests 
of the family firm (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004) and family business members may hold business objectives 
above their personal objectives (Zahra, 2003). Given that reciprocal altruism facilitates bonding through 
trust, communication, respect and love (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling & Dino, 2005); family firms can foster 
collectivistic behaviors rather than self-serving behaviors (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). 
Family relationships characterized by asymmetric altruism can lead to other agency problems such as 
owner-managers’ taking actions that can harm themselves and others, adverse-selection (i.e. the principal 
hires an agent who is less able, committed, industrious, ethical, or whose interests are less compatible 
with those of the principal than expected), and moral hazard (i.e. “lack of effort on the part of the agent”) 
(Chrisman, et al., 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989: 61; Jensen, 1994; Schulze, et al., 2001). Within the framework 
of agency theory, people are indeed motivated by nonmonetary factors such as altruism, and may harm 
themselves and others in the case of asymmetric altruism (Jensen, 1994). For example, when parents with 
nepotistic tendencies hire and promote offspring (or other kin) based on irrelevant criteria (e.g., kinship 
ties) in contrast to competence (Perrow, 1972), this leads to adverse selection and biased evaluation, and 
results in inertia in strategic decision making. These problems can harm long term survival and growth in 
family firms (Chua, et al., 2003; Dyer, 2006). 
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Principal-Principal versus Principal-Agent Agency Problems in Publicly Traded Family Firms 
In publicly traded family firms, agency problems are expected to be different from those in nonfamily 
firms exhibiting more principal-agent agency problems, as well as from privately held family firms 
because of the existence of various groups of owners and/or managers with different and often conflicting 
interests (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001). Given that family owners often hold management positions, the 
interests of owners and managers tend to be relatively more aligned than in nonfamily publicly traded 
firms. Additionally, direct involvement of family owners in management elevates the ability to monitor 
the managers (Maury, 2006). As a result, publicly traded family firms tend to exhibit less severe 
principal-agent agency problems that typically arise from the separation of ownership and management. 
However, these controlling family owners and managers in family controlled corporations are likely 
to hold interests that are not identical to those of non-controlling shareholders, who have less power 
because of their relatively lower levels of ownership and no involvement in management. Hence, in 
publicly traded family firms, the concern is that when the management and board positions are dominated 
by the family, they may act for the controlling family by pursuing family-centered goals but not for the 
non-controlling owners in general (Morck & Yeung, 2003). Indeed, families’ significant stock ownership 
and control over the board of directors may allow families to pursue their own interests, which may be 
different from those of non-controlling owners (Ali, et al., 2007; Maury, 2006). Some families may 
exhibit more interest for the private benefits of control; i.e. benefits appropriated by large shareholders at 
the expense of minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and the preservation of socio-emotional 
wealth to achieve noneconomic goals (Chrisman, et al., 2003, forthcoming; Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2007) 
than increasing shareholder wealth. For example, a controlling family may favor diversification to create 
jobs for its members and sustaining its control, even though the investment may not be profitable for the 
firm and may lower shareholder value. Therefore, some family firms exhibit more severe principal- 
principal agency problems arising between controlling and non-controlling owners. 
Principal-principal agency problems are typically in the forms of expropriation of non-controlling 
shareholder wealth and managerial entrenchment. Expropriation occurs when governance is problematic, 
especially when large or majority owners control the firm and limit non-controlling owners’ right to 
appropriate returns on their investments (Dharwadkar, et al., 2000; Young, et al., 2008). Concentrated 
control simplifies the task of monitoring agents (who may also be owners), but elevates the incentive and 
power of owners to expropriate minority shareholder wealth (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Andres, 
2008; La Porta et al. 1999). One way that controlling owners expropriate non-controlling shareholder 
wealth is by tunneling through non-arm’s-length, related-party, and self-dealing transactions (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Young, et al., 2008). Management can also hold excessive cash within the firm, allowing 
the family to exploit it to their private benefit instead of investing or returning it to investors (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Managers’ resistance to value-increasing takeovers in order to protect the private benefits 
of family control can also lower shareholder wealth (Mahoney, et al., 1996, 1997; Cremers & Nair, 2005). 
Therefore, family managers’ anti-takeover actions, independent of the price offered, indicates managerial 
pursuit of self- and family-interest at the expense of shareholders (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). In fact, 
Gompers, et al. (2003) show that anti-takeover Governance Index provisions in the US are associated 
with lower firm value. Building on Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the problem of expropriation can be acute 
particularly when the controlling owners are wealthy enough and they simply prefer to maximize private 
benefits of control rather than wealth. 
Besides the expropriation problem, higher levels of ownership and management can also result in 
managerial entrenchment of family members. Entrenchment occurs when a manager remains active in the 
company and resists transfer of control (Anderson, et al., 2002; Anderson & Reeb, 2003a). Entrenchment 
limits strategic change and results in inertia, which may harm firm performance. Entrenchment persists 
because managers obscure or hide negative attributes, hire consultants to legitimize decisions, influence 
the board to elude monitoring, manipulate information, make themselves indispensable by initiating 
projects that require their skills and abilities, and attribute poor firm performance to environmental factors 
(Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2001; Walsh & Seward, 1990). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) argue that family firms 
may be more prone to managerial entrenchment. The authors assert that family ties and emotions may 
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influence the perceived competence of the family executive(s), lowering the objectivity in monitoring and 
resulting in biased judgments of executive performance. 
In sum, both expropriation and entrenchment of the controlling family are principal-principal agency 
problems which can harm non-controlling shareholder value. However, we still do not know enough 
about how family owners and managers may be expropriating and entrenching themselves in corporations 
controlled by families. The controlling families’ tendencies to use different types of corporate governance 
provisions may be the key in understanding these phenomena. Indeed, the use of corporate governance 
provisions can enable and empower controlling owners to expropriate non-controlling shareholder wealth 
and entrench themselves, if they intend to. Therefore, in the next section, we discuss family involvement 
in corporate governance and the use of governance provisions within the context of publicly traded family 
firms, which may play a critical role in the prevalence of principal-principal agency problems in publicly 
traded family firms. 
 
FAMILY INVOLVEMENT IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Family firms are distinguished from nonfamily and other family firms by the level and type of 
influence they exert on firm behavior through ownership and management (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 
2005; Chua, et al., 1999). Family involvement is substantial “when a family owns all or a controlling 
portion of the business and plays an active role in setting strategy and in operating the business on a day- 
to-day basis” (Kelly, et al., 2000: 27). Ownership and management are important in determining the 
family’s ability to exert its influence on an ongoing business (Sundaramurthy & Kreiner, 2008). 
Concentrated holdings by families in publicly traded firms tend to be universally common, despite legal 
restrictions on high levels of ownership (La Porta, et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2009). An effective corporate governance can elevate both controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders’ wealth and align their interests. The use of corporate governance provisions is an integral 
part of corporate governance, as we discuss in the following section. 
 
Classification of Governance Provisions within the Context of Family Firms 
Gompers et al. (2003) suggest that governance provisions generally allow management to resist 
shareholder activism, and prevent or delay takeovers, as can be seen in Appendix A. According to 
Danielson and Karpoff (1998), firms tend to use governance provisions in groups. In line with Danielson 
and Karpoff’s (1998) argument, Gompers et al. (2003) divide governance provisions into five groups 
based upon the purpose of their usage: tactics for delaying takeovers (delay), director/officer protection 
(protection), voting rights (voting), state laws (state), and other takeover defenses (other). However, the 
authors do not differentiate between family and nonfamily firms nor consider the differences between 
controlling family and non-controlling owner groups and their distinct characteristics and interests within 
the context of family firms. For example, controlling owners can decide “what businesses to enter and 
exit, what companies to acquire, what assets to sell, how much to invest, what officers and directors to 
select, how much to pay them, and how much money (if any) to distribute themselves and minority 
shareholders”, whereas non-controlling owners usually “participate in dividend or other cash-flow 
distributions (that controlling owners decide on), and benefit from capital gains (if there are any, and if 
the shares can be freely sold so that minority shareholders indeed realize those gains)” (Villalonga, 2009: 
1,2). Controlling owners may pursue family-centered goals and strategies to achieve those goals, which 
may consequently be beneficial to the controlling family, but not to the non-controlling owners and the 
firm in general, which can consequently harm firm performance. Hence, it is important to identify 
differences between family and nonfamily firms, examine family firm owners, managers, directors, and 
non-controlling owners, and their propensity to use different types of governance provisions in order to 
have a better understanding of the corporate governance idiosyncrasies in publicly traded family firms. 
Since the main purpose of this paper is to shed light onto the differential impact of family 
involvement in ownership and management on the use of governance provisions protecting controlling 
and non-controlling owners and the family firms involve these ownership groups with distinct interests, 
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we first classify the provisions based on the purpose of usage by different interest groups, as can be seen 
in Appendix A. Second, the propositions are developed concerning the impact of family involvement on 
the use of provisions protecting controlling and non-controlling owners, who are the main interest groups 
in publicly traded family firms. 
 
Provisions Protecting Controlling Owners 
These provisions enhance controlling owners’ rights and power. They provide protection to the 
controlling owners by delaying the transfer of control to a raider or an acquiring firm through placing 
preferred stock with certain preferred shareholders, requiring a majority vote for the acquisition, requiring 
a waiting period for the raider company to acquire the target firm, making acquisition expensive or 
unattractive, diluting the potential acquirer’s voting power, enhancing voting rights of controlling owners 
through concentrating controlling owners’ votes or limiting non-controlling owners’ rights, helping 
controlling owners elect directors, or elevating the value of controlling owners’ shares, as can be seen in 
Appendix A and explained below. 
These provisions are also sub-grouped based on different purposes of use such as enhancing voting 
rights (i.e. cumulative voting, unequal voting rights, and supermajority) and sustaining controlling status 
(i.e. poison pills, blank check, bylaw, charter, business combination laws, fair price, and anti-greenmail). 
According to Davis (1991), these provisions both indicate and enhance controlling owners’ influence on 
the business. Controlling owners who are able to adopt them already have substantial voice, and by 
having them in place, they protect themselves from the market for corporate control by elevating the 
barriers to particularly takeover (Davis, 1991). 
Controlling families often increase their power and voice by elevating their voting rights and creating 
a discrepancy between their voting rights and cash flow rights (Villalonga & Amit, 2006a, 2006b). 
Unequal voting rights can elevate the controlling family’s voting rights while limiting the voting rights of 
non-controlling owners and cumulative voting can lead to family’s concentrating their votes and electing 
directors. Mergers or acquisitions can also be delayed or prevented by using supermajority provision 
requiring majority voting for the approval of such activities. 
Additionally, a controlling family aiming to preserve family control over the firm (Gomez-Mejia, et 
al., 2007) is expected to be willing to take anti-takeover actions such as delaying or preventing takeovers 
through issuing blank checks (i.e. placing preferred stock) for family members and/or family’s well 
trusted particular business partners or investors. A required waiting period by business combination law 
can also prolong family control by delaying or preventing takeovers. Moreover, bylaw and charter 
amendment limitations restrict non-controlling shareholders’ ability to amend the governing documents of 
the company, which is also beneficial for the controlling family in preventing a change that may result in 
the loss or a decrease in family control. In addition, poison pills allow the target firm’s shareholders to 
buy the shares of the target firm at a discount, which makes the target firm unattractive for the raider and 
dilutes the voting power of the raider. Since shareholder approval is not required for the use of poison 
pills, the controlling family can utilize this provision through being influential over management, who has 
the full discretion over poison pill usage decisions. Another way for families to extend their control is to 
make their firm unattractive and expensive for potential raiders. For those purposes, the controlling family 
can use fair price provision to make their firm expensive by requiring the acquirer to pay the highest price 
to all shareholders or use anti-greenmail to discourage potential bidders from bidding for a takeover. 
 
Provisions Protecting Non-Controlling Owners 
These provisions (i.e. cash-out laws and secret ballot) increase value of non-controlling owners’ 
shares in case of selling shares to a controlling owner, put an acquisition to a vote of shareholders, and 
ensure the secrecy of voting. Hence, they delay and prevent takeovers while increasing non-controlling 
owners’ rights. However, since the use of these provisions can diminish controlling owners’ power 
substantially while increasing non-controlling owners’ rights, families preferring to maintain family 
control are expected to be less likely to use them than nonfamily firms. 
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Provisions Protecting Management and Directors 
These provisions enhance management’s and directors’ power and rights. As can be seen in Appendix 
A and explained below, these provisions protect managers and directors’ positions, protect their monetary 
benefits, and protect them against legal actions. These mechanisms do this by requiring extra time to 
replace the management and/or board of directors and providing monetary benefits to senior executives 
and directors in case of a change of control, limiting the managers’ and directors’ personal liability, and 
enabling the board of directors to reject or delay takeovers even though they may be beneficial to non- 
controlling shareholders. Classified board, director’s duties, special meeting, and written consent delay or 
prevent takeovers or proxy fights. Compensation plans, golden parachute, and severance provide 
executives and directors monetary compensation and nonmonetary benefits that assure the continuity of 
their position in case of a change in control. Contracts, indemnification, and limitations on director’s 
liability indemnify executives and directors from legal liabilities. Hence, these provisions are sub-grouped 
into provisions protecting managers and directors in terms of their positions in the firm and protecting 
them monetarily and legally. 
Management in family and nonfamily publicly traded firms are likely to use different subgroups of 
the provisions protecting managers according to their distinct primary interests. Family firm managers 
and directors are expected to be particularly concerned with maintaining their positions in the firm owing 
to their long-term orientation (James, 1999a; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005) and desire for preservation 
of family control in the business (Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2007), whereas nonfamily managers may be more 
concerned with monetary and legal protection. Additionally, the provisions protecting managers and 
directors in terms of their positions in the firm protect controlling owners indirectly since they delay or 
prevent takeovers. Indeed, the protection of managers’ and directors’ positions can enable the controlling 
family to continue to exert influence over the business through management. 
 
Provisions Protecting Others (i.e. A Broad Group of Employees) 
These provisions (i.e. pension parachute and silver parachute) provide severance payments and secure 
the pension fund to a broader group of employees of the target firm in case of an acquisition. Because 
these provisions make a takeover more expensive for the bidder, family firms are expected to utilize these 
provisions in order to protect controlling owners and management indirectly. The expected use of these 
provisions is also in line with research suggesting family firms’ greater employee care and loyalty 
(Donckels & Frochlich, 1991; Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Ward, 1988). Family firms exhibiting 
greater concern for the employees’ wellbeing and the positive image and reputation in public eye are 
likely to use these provisions more than nonfamily firms do (Habbershon & Williams, 1999). 
 
PROPOSITIONS DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this section, the propositions for our conceptual model are developed. We focus on the links 
between family involvement (i.e. family ownership and family management) and the frequency of the use 
of provisions protecting controlling and non-controlling owners. The model illustrates how family 
ownership affects the frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting controlling and non- 
controlling owners and how family management moderates these relationships. 
The use of governance provisions differ across firms owing to firm-specific and industry-level factors 
and different costs and benefits associated with them (Gillan, et al., 2003). Publicly traded family firms 
are expected to differ from nonfamily firms in terms of the frequency of the use of different types of 
governance provisions owing to different interest groups with distinct interests. There may be controlling 
owners and/or management in both family and nonfamily firms (Brecht, et al., 2005). Nevertheless, their 
composition in each firm context is different. In family firms, controlling owners are usually the family 
members and management is composed of family members and nonfamily members likely to be trusted 
by the controlling family (Brecht, et al., 2005). In nonfamily firms, management tends to control the firm 
since the shareholders are often dispersed (Berle & Means, 1936; Demsetz, 1983). When there is an 
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individual or institution as a blockholder, their interests are also likely to differ from those of a controlling 
family. 
 
FIGURE 1 
THE LINK BETWEEN FAMILY INVOLVEMENT AND PROVISIONS PROTECTING 
CONTROLLING AND NON-CONTROLLING OWNERS 
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Family Ownership and Governance Provisions Protecting Controlling Owners 
In family firms, family members are often involved in ownership and management, and board of 
directors as well (Miller, et al., 2007). Higher levels of ownership and control endow families with 
substantial  discretion  to  exercise  property  rights  as  they  want  (e.g.  alter,  modify,  or  destroy,  and 
appropriate rents) (Gedajlovic, et al., 2003). In some cases, family owners may prefer to play only the role 
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of investor, without participating in management, or the family owners may prefer professional nonfamily 
managers if they are not able or willing to manage the firm themselves. 
However, in nonfamily firms, ownership and management are often separated. Dispersed owners with 
relatively little ownership share usually do not participate in management and the board. Since there is no 
controlling owner, the management holds the control power (Morck, et al., 2005). In some instances, an 
individual or an institution may be a blockholder (i.e. large shareholder) in nonfamily firms (Brecht, et al., 
2005) and this individual or group may be involved in management and/or board as well. Whether 
dispersed or blockholder, the ownership in nonfamily firms tends to possess different interests than the 
family-centered interests of controlling families in publicly traded firms. 
In family firms, the controlling owners’ interests are largely focused on the preservation of the 
ownership control of the family. In extreme cases of preservation of family control and socio-emotional 
wealth, families may even be willing to forego the possibility of higher firm performance (Gomez-Mejia, 
et al., 2007). To be able to pursue family-oriented goals and preserve family control, family owners are 
likely to attempt to insulate themselves from non-controlling shareholder activism through enhancing the 
controlling family’s voting rights and sustaining their controlling status. Hence, family firms are expected 
to utilize control enhancing governance provisions, which can primarily elevate their power through 
voting rights in excess of cash-flow rights and sustain their controlling owner status in order to be able to 
reflect the family’s vision into business practices and to pass their family legacy to future generations. 
Conversely, nonfamily firms are likely to use provisions that protect their status, position, and power 
less frequently than family firms, owing to the shareholders’ short-term orientation. Family owners’ 
concern for the preservation of family control over the business is rooted in their long-term orientation 
with considerations for the family’s future in terms of income, jobs, and security (Miller & Le Breton- 
Miller, 2005a, 2005b). In long-term oriented family firms, family members tend to refrain from the 
pursuit of short-term personal gains for the long-term well-being of the family firm and invest in the 
business for continued prosperity and growth (Gómez-Mejía, et al., 2007; Miller, et al., 2008, 2010). 
Owing to the concern for the long-haul and dynastic thinking (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006), family firm 
leaders often refrain from following faddish trends, instead envision a longstanding family firm with 
continuous family involvement and steadfast investment strategies. 
However, after an optimum level of ownership is reached, families may not be concerned with the 
further enhancement of voting rights and controlling status since the higher levels of ownership will 
naturally provide them substantial voting rights and allow them to exert and maintain control over the 
firm. Hence, after a certain point of family ownership, family owners’ frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting controlling owners’ voting rights (i.e. unequal voting rights, cumulative voting, and 
supermajority) and controlling status (i.e. blank check, business combination laws, poison pill, bylaw, 
charter, fair price, and atigreenmail) is likely to diminish. 
 
Proposition 1a. Family ownership will have an inverted u-shaped relationship with the 
frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting controlling owners’ voting 
rights. 
Proposition 1b. Family ownership will have an inverted u-shaped relationship with the 
frequency  of  the  use  of  governance  provisions  protecting  controlling  owners’ 
controlling status. 
 
Family Ownership and Governance Provisions Protecting Non-controlling Owners 
Governance   provisions   protecting   non-controlling   owners   (i.e.   cash-out   laws,   control-share 
acquisition laws, secret ballot, and antigreenmail) tend to empower them at the expense of the family 
owners’ controlling power. Control-share acquisition laws requiring a vote of the shareholders for an 
acquisition can prevent controlling family’s expansion into businesses which can be beneficial primarily 
to the family (e.g. job creation to the family members) through non-controlling owners’ having a say and 
secret ballot placing confidentiality on shareholders’ voting can enable non-controlling shareholders to 
make decisions against the controlling family’s will. 
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Since the empowerment of non-controlling owners requires controlling owners to compromise control 
and power, family owners may not be willing to use them. Indeed, family owners tend to be generally 
unwilling or reluctant to dilute their control of the firm to nonfamily members (Gedajlovic, et al., 2004). 
Additionally, if non-controlling owners are empowered, they can initiate proxy fights (Hart, 1995) and 
replace top management team members and board of directors. Accordingly, Burkart et al. (2003) argue 
that families usually desire to maintain control as long as they can. However, they may be willing to let 
go of control in case of a need to raise capital, or the death of the founder, or to avoid high inheritance 
taxes (Burkart, et al., 2003). 
In addition, the preservation of family control facilitates reputational benefits in both economic and 
political markets. If family control is diminished, the family may compromise its well established family 
firm image and reputation as well as political connections (Burkart, et al., 2003). These may constitute the 
rationale for families’ “hanging on the control too long” (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003). 
Hence, controlling family owners are expected to restrict non-controlling owners’ influence on the 
firm and insulate themselves from non-controlling owners’ activism through the relatively less use of 
provisions protecting non-controlling owners. However, in nonfamily firms, since the non-controlling 
owners are the majority with substantially less power than that of management, they may be more prone 
to have these provisions in place to enhance their voice over the dominant management. 
 
Proposition 2. Family ownership will be negatively associated with the frequency of the 
use of governance provisions protecting non-controlling owners. 
 
Moderation Effects of Family Management on the Relationships between Family Ownership and 
the Frequency of the Use of Governance Provisions Protecting Controlling and Non-controlling 
Owners 
According to Schulze and Gedajlovic (2010), studies have not always distinguished between the 
different effects of family ownership and family management. On the one hand, family owners may 
desire to govern their firms in certain idiosyncratic ways. On the other hand, family’s involvement in 
management can facilitate family owners’ governing their firms in the ways they desire. 
In some cases, family management may not always accompany family ownership. Indeed, some 
family owners may not be willing and/or able to be involved in management and prefer to play the 
investor role. However, it is uncommon for families to be solely involved in management without any 
ownership. Therefore, in this paper, family management is distinguished from family ownership and 
investigated as a moderator in the relationship between family ownership and the frequency of the use of 
governance provisions protecting controlling owners and non-controlling owners owing to its 
strengthening family owners’ ability and willingness to adopt and utilize governance provisions that may 
primarily meet the family’s needs. 
Family involvement in management can legitimize family owners’ authority and empower family 
owners to take actions benefiting the family. When more family members are involved in management 
and the board, the resistance of nonfamily managers or non-controlling owners to controlling family’s 
decisions and actions will be less effective. Hence, family owners’ and management’s goals are expected 
be aligned (Chrisman, et al., 2010). This can enhance the owners’ ability to protect their voting rights, 
controlling status while limiting non-controlling owners’ rights through the adoption and the use of 
governance provisions serving these purposes. 
Without active participation in management, family owners’ influence over management and the 
board to adopt the provisions exclusively serving the family’s needs may not be as substantial. Also, 
when family owners prefer not to use certain provisions, which may interfere with the sustainability of 
family control or may not be needed by the family owing to higher levels of equity ownership position, 
family’s involvement in management will enable them not to use such provisions. For example, family 
management will strengthen the ability of family owners’ use of provisions protecting controlling owners 
through voting rights up to an optimum ownership level and then after the optimum level, family 
management  will  strengthen  family  owners’  ability  not  to  use  those  provisions.  Similarly,  family 
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management will strengthen the ability of family owners’ use of provisions protecting controlling owners 
through sustaining controlling status up to an optimum ownership level. Then, after this optimum level, 
family management will strengthen family owners’ ability not to use those provisions since family 
owners simply may not need them at higher ownership levels. Hence, family management will strengthen 
the effects of family ownership on the frequency of the use of governance mechanisms. In inverted u- 
shaped relationships, this will result in a shift of the inverted u-shaped curve through a shift of the optimal 
point. 
 
Proposition 3a. Family management will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship 
between family ownership and the frequency of the use of governance provisions 
protecting controlling owners through voting rights, such that family management 
will strengthen the positive effects of family ownership on the frequency of these 
governance provisions up to an optimum level, and then strengthen the negative 
effects of family ownership on the frequency of the use of these provisions after the 
optimum level. 
Proposition 3b. Family management will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship 
between family ownership and the frequency of the use of governance provisions 
protecting controlling owners through sustaining their controlling status, such that 
family management will strengthen the positive effects of family ownership on the 
frequency  of  these  governance  provisions  up  to  an  optimum  level,  and  then 
strengthen the negative effects of family ownership on the frequency of the use of 
these provisions after the optimum level. 
Proposition 3c. Family management will moderate the relationship between family 
ownership and the frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting non- 
controlling owners, such that family management will strengthen the negative effects 
of family ownership on the frequency of the use of these governance provisions. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Studies highlight the distinctive effects of family involvement (i.e. ownership and management) on 
the behavior of publicly traded firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Claessens, et al., 2002; Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). However, we still do not know enough about what leads to differences 
between publicly traded family firms and nonfamily firms and also among family firms themselves, 
idiosyncrasies  in  the  ways  they  own  and  control  corporations,  and  the  outcomes  of  the  family 
involvement in the businesses. In our paper, we draw attention to the use of control enhancing governance 
provisions since they may play an important role in corporate governance, consequently affecting firm 
performance and shareholder value (Gompers, et al., 2003). 
Hence, this paper suggests that the theory of the family firm will be further developed by the 
investigation of the link between family involvement components (i.e. family ownership and family 
management) and control enhancing governance provisions particularly protecting controlling and non- 
controlling owners. These main interest groups in corporations may hold conflicting interests, which may 
cause principal-principal agency problems that are harmful to overall firm performance and shareholder 
wealth. Accordingly, this paper addresses the question of: How do family ownership and management 
differentially affect the use of governance provisions protecting controlling and non-controlling owners? 
Therefore, this paper first classifies corporate governance provisions within the context of family firms, 
and then develops a conceptual model linking family involvement (i.e. family ownership and family 
management) and the use of governance provisions protecting controlling and non-controlling owners. 
The reason for our focus on these provisions is that they may be associated with the exacerbation of 
principal-principal agency problems in family firms that can be detrimental to firm performance and 
shareholder value. 
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This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper emphasizes the importance of 
family involvement within the context of corporations owing to the prevalence of corporations around the 
world exhibiting family ownership and management. Second, it explains how family ownership and 
family management differentially influence the frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting 
controlling and non-controlling owners. Specifically, we suggest that family ownership will have inverted 
u-shaped relationships with the frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling and non- 
controlling owners. We also suggest that family ownership will moderate these relationships. This paper 
is one of the few attempts to use principal-principal agency and corporate governance perspectives to 
explain the impact of family dynamics on corporate governance. Third, the contributions of this paper 
move us forward in the advancement of the theory of the family firm (Chrisman, et al., 2005; Conner, 
1991). 
In this paper, the seven categories of governance provisions that group the 24 provisions identified by 
Gompers et al. (2003) according to the purposes of their usage by firms are formed by a judgment-based 
categorization (Perreault & Leigh, 1989). Validity of this categorization is assessed via expert judges. The 
judges assessed the degree to which provisions represent the categories (i.e. variables) (Netemeyer, et al., 
2003). A list of provisions, definitions of provisions, and the categories were provided to the judges. We 
asked them to select the proper category for each provision and compared results to our categorization. 
The judges’ categorizations were compatible with ours. Future research can provide further assessments 
of this classification. 
Aside from the links between family involvement and the use provisions protecting controlling and 
non-controlling owners suggested in this paper, other links (i.e. family involvement and the use of 
governance provisions protecting managers and board members, and a broad group of employees) can be 
investigated. Furthermore, the effects of family involvement on the use of governance provisions might 
vary in family firms depending upon generational involvement, industry, and life-cycle phases. All these 
factors suggest additional applications of corporate governance to the study of family businesses. 
In conclusion, this paper provides principal-principal agency and corporate governance perspectives 
to family involvement in publicly traded family firms. The differences between family and nonfamily 
firms as well as the model presented in this paper can help scholars, family business members, and 
investors better understand family involvement in corporate governance. If publicly traded family firms 
can elevate the positive effects of family involvement through the proper use of corporate governance 
mechanisms and lower agency problems, they can achieve long-term competitive advantages. Publicly 
traded family firms with proper use of corporate governance provisions will be sought after by the 
investors and reap the benefits of positive corporate publicity. 
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APPENDIX A 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS PROTECTING CONTROLLING VS. 
NON-CONTROLLING OWNERS 
 
Provisions Definitions (Gillan et al, 2003; Gompers, et al., 2003; 
Mahoney, et al., 1997) 
Provisions protecting 
controlling owners 
through enhancing 
voting rights 
 
Unequal Voting Rights To limit voting rights of some shareholders and expand those of others. 
Cumulative Voting Allows shareholders to concentrate their votes and helps minority 
shareholders to elect directors. 
Supermajority Voting requirements for approval of mergers. 
Provisions protecting 
controlling owners 
through sustaining 
controlling status 
 
Blank Check A preferred stock over which the BOD has broad authority to determine 
voting, dividend, conversion, and other rights. It is used to prevent takeover 
by placing this stock with certain friendly investors. 
Business Combination 
Law 
Requires a waiting period for transactions such as mergers, unless the 
transaction is approved by the BOD. 
Poison Pills Give the holders of the target firm’s stocks the right to purchase stocks in 
the target at a discount and to sell shares at a premium if ownership 
changes. This makes the target unattractive. 
Bylaw Amendment limitations limit shareholders’ ability to amend the governing 
documents of the company. 
Charter Limitations on making changes on the governance documents. 
Fair Price Requires a bidder to pay to all shareholders the highest price paid to any 
during a period of time before the commencement of an offer. This makes 
an acquisition more expensive. 
Anti-greenmail Prohibits a firm’s controlling owners/managers from paying a raider 
‘greenmail’, which involves the repurchase of blocks of company stock, at a 
premium above market price, in exchange for an agreement by the raider 
not to acquire the firm. Eliminating greenmail may discourage potential 
bidders from considering the target firm for a takeover. Hence, it can be 
used as an antitakeover device. 
Provisions protecting 
non-controlling owners 
 
Cash-out Laws Shareholders can sell their stakes to a controlling shareholder at a price 
based on the highest price of recently acquired shares. It works as fair-price 
provisions extended to non-takeover situations. 
Secret Ballot Confidential voting. Either an independent third party or employees sworn 
to secrecy count proxy votes and management does not look at proxy cards. 
Provisions protecting 
management and 
directors’ positions 
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Classified Board The board is split into different classes, with only one class up for election 
in a given year. Hence, an outsider who gains control of a corporation may 
need to wait a few years in order to be able to gain control of the board. 
Special Meeting 
Limitations 
Bidders must wait until the regularly scheduled annual meeting to replace 
BOD or dismantle takeover defenses. 
Written Consent 
Limitations 
Bidders must wait until the regularly scheduled annual meeting to replace 
BOD or to dismantle takeover defense. 
Directors’ Duties Provides BOD with a legal basis for rejecting a takeover that would have 
been beneficial to shareholders. 
Provisions protecting 
management and 
directors monetarily 
 
Compensation Plans In case of a change in control, this provision allows participants of incentive 
bonus plans to cash out options or accelerate the payout of bonuses. 
Golden Parachutes Severance agreements that provide cash or noncash compensation to senior 
executives upon an event such as termination, demotion, or resignation 
following a change in control. 
Severance Agreements assuring executives of their positions or some compensation 
and are not contingent upon a change in control. 
Provisions protecting 
management and 
directors legally 
 
Contracts Indemnifies officers and directors from certain legal expenses and 
judgments resulting from lawsuits. 
Indemnification Indemnify officers and directors from certain legal expenses and judgments 
resulting from lawsuits pertaining to their conduct. 
Limitations on Director 
Liability 
Limit directors’ personal liability. 
Provisions protecting 
others 
 
Pension Parachutes To prevent an acquirer from using surplus cash in the pension fund of the 
target firm. 
Silver Parachute To provide severance payments to a large number of firm’s employees upon 
a change in control. 
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